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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

S'TATE OF UTAH

GEORGE W. SMITH,
Plaintiff and App·ellant,
-vs.-

Case No. 9290

D. W. LOERTSCHER,
Defendant .and Resp-onde.nt.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

(The parties will be refe-rred to as they ap·p,eared
in the trial court. The numbers in parenthesis refer to
page number of the reeord.)
STATE~fENT

OF THE CASE
1

This is an appeal by plaintiff from a judgment in
favor of defendant for no cause of action (85). The judgment was based upon .a special verdict of a jury in which
the jury answered two p·ropositions (83, 84).
This action is on a written contract for a broke-r's
commission (Exhibit 1). Plaintiff is the real estate
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broker and defendant the seller and owner of the land
involved. The contract provided that if plaintiff found a
buyer 'vho was ready, able and willing to buy certain
ranch property located in Summit County, Utah, at the
listed price and terms, or at any other price or terms to
which defendant might agree during the life of the contract, then defendant agreed to pay plaintiff a $5,000
commission. Plaintiff contends that he produced J. Holman Waters, a buyer ready, able and willing to buy said
property, but defendant's refusal to go through with the
transaction prevented the sale, but nevertheless entitled
plaintiff to a cormnission.
Plaintiff is a real estate broker and had been attempting to locate a ranch for Mr. Waters where he could
raise cattle (101). After considerable discussion defendant signed with plaintiff a listing agreement dated
F·ebruary 14, 1959 (103-106). The selling price was there
listed at $128,000, twenty-nine percent down and ten equal
yearly payments, the buyer to assume the mortgage which
was on the property, and interest at the rate of 5¥2%
per annum (See Exhibit 1).
Thereafter, plaintiff brought Waters to the ranch
and Waters looked it over and defendant pointed out
the boundaries and generally showed Mr. Waters over
the premises (106, 107).
On the 20th day of February, 1959, Mr. Waters made
an offe-r in writing wherein he offered to p·ay $125,000;
Twenty 'Thousand ($20,000) Dollars down, Twenty Three
Thousand ($23,000) Dollars being the unpaid balance
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of a 1nortgage which \\·as payable $675.00 annually, and
the balance of Seventy Seven Thousand ($77,000) D·ollars
to be pay·able in 12 equal, annual payments together with
interest on the unpaid balance at the rate of 5% p·er
annu1n (Exhibit 4). Possession date was on or before
~larch 20, 1959. The offer \vas delivered February 20
to defendant ( 119) and t,,~o or three days late·r he told
plaintiff he \Vas going to see a tax expert in connection
\Vi th the transaction ( 119).
On February 26, 1959, defendant went to the hotel
to see plaintiff and both of them went to Mr. W a.ters'
office ( 122). After discussion plaintiff and defendant
\Yent to the offiee of R. J. Hogan, an attorney at law,
\Yho was asked to prepare a vvritten contract for the
signatures of defendant and l\1:r. Waters: He prepared
the contract Exhibit 6 (199). On March 6th defendant
left a copy of this contract on l\1:r. Waters' desk at his
office in Salt Lake City (128, 200).
Therafter, on l\.farch 9th, Mr. Waters informed plaintiff he objecte-d to the provision that defendant was to
retain ¥2 of his water right (130, 170). After a 2¥2
hour discussion defendant and l\fr. Waters went to the
office of Mr. Hogan for the purpose of having him redraft the agreement (172-4, 228). After discussion with
~1:r. Hogan and defendant Mr. Waters left feeling that
they had reached a complete agree·ment as to all things
whieh were to be included in the contract (177). Defendant's testimony is to the contrary and that they had
not resolved the question of the date of when p·ossession
was to be turned over to Mr. Waters (203).
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Nothing further was done in connection with the contract until son1e time later, the estimates of time being
anywhere from 11arch 31st to the middle of April (140,
215). In any event, at that time defendant 'vent to see
Mr. Waters at his ranch here in Salt Lake City. There is a
conflict in the testimony as to exactly what took place.
Defendant asserts he asked Waters for another and later
possession date (216). Waters testified defendant merely
stated he did not want to go through with the deal (178).
T·he parties stipulated that Mr. Waters was able financially to p·erform any of the commitments mentioned
in the testimony.
This briefly sets forth the facts and we will discuss
at greater length the evidence under each particular
point. The evidence in this case was sufficient to support a finding for either party. Defendant's testimony
was to the effect that he and 1\:fr. Waters had never resolved all of their differences, p·articularly with relation
to delivery possession. On the other hand, Waters testified that complete agree1nent had been reached and he
had been willing to accept all of the provisions suggested
by defendant.
The contentions of plaintiff seeking revers.al, attack
instructions given and failure to give plaintiff's reque~sted instructions.
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ST'ATEMENT OF POIN'TS
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COUR:T ERRED IN REFUSING PLAINTIFF'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS THAT IF DEFENDANT AND WATERS AGREED TO 'THE PRICE AND TERMS
OF SALE TO BE PLACED IN 'THE WRIT'TEN CONTRACT
OF SALE THEN PLAINTIFF HAD PRODUCED A READY,
ABLE AND WILLING BUYER.
POIN·T II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INSTRUCTING THE
JURY THA'T THE AGREElVIENT BETWEEN DEFENDANT
AND WATERS WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE.
POIN·T III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INS'TRUCTING THE
JURY THA'T THE WRITTEN OFFER DID NOT COMPLY
WITH THE LISTING AGREEMENT.
POINT IV.
THE 'T·RIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRU:GT THE JURY THA'T IF THE PARTIES AGREED
TO THE PRICE AND 'TERMS FOR THE SALE AND DEFENDANT LATER CALLED THE 'TRANSACTION OFF,
PLAINTIFF WAS EN'TITLED TO A VERDICT.
POINT' V.
THE TRIAL COUR·T ERRED IN SUBMIT'TING TO 'THE
J·URY PROPOSITION NO. 2 AS TO WHE'THER AT THE
TIME THE LISTING AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED BY DEFENDANT PLAINTIFF KNEW THAT DEFENDANT'S WIFE
WAS A CO-OWNER O·F 'THE PROPERTY.

ARGill1ENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING PLAINTIFF'S REQUES'TED INSTRUCTIONS THAT IF DEFENDANT AND WATERS AGREED TO ·THE PRICE AND TERMS
OF SALE TO BE PLACED IN 'THE WRIT'TEN CONTRACT
OF SALE THEN PLAINTIFF HAD PRO-DUCED A READY,
ABLE AND WILLING BUYER.
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After the trial court .announced that the case was to
be submitted to the jury on written interrogatories plaintiff sought to have the issues presented to the jury in
clear and simple languag·e that if defendant and Waters
agreed to the price and terms which were to be put in
the contract for the sale of the prop·erty, then plaintiff
had produced a buyer who was ready and willing to purchase the p·roperty involved. Under sueh circumstances
plaintiff would be entitled to judgment. Curtis v. Mortensen, 1 Utah 2d 354, 267 P.2d 237; McCormick v. Life
Insurance Co., 6 Utah 2d 170, 308 P.2d 949'; Hoyt v. Wasatch Homes, Inc., 1 Utah 2d 9, 261 P.2d 927; Down v.
DeGroot, 83 ·Cal. App. 155, 256 Pac. 438. The express
terms of the listing agreement is that plaintiff was to find
a buyer, not to effect a sale.

That some provisions were to be left for future
determination would be immaterial. Agreeing to the
terms of the sale upon which they were willing to contract
would constitute a meeting of the minds. That is the
simple proposition which plaintiff sought to have presented to the jury by his requested Instruction No. 5
(52) as follows:

''INSTRUCTION NO. 5
"Did the defendant, as the seller, and J.
Holman Wate·rs, as the buyer, reach a complete
oral, or verbal understanding as to the price and
terms which should be placed in the ''Titten contract for the sale of the real estate'"
This proposition 'vas also succinctly stated in plaintiff's requested instruction No. 3 (50) as follows :
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"INSTRUCTION NO·. 3
"If the parties agreed as to what matters
should go into the written contract for the sale
of the real estate, then a complete agreement was
reache·d even though other matte~rs were left out,
or the parties agreed to leave certain matters
out of the contract, or agreed to leave certain
matters for future determination.
"In other words, if the parties agreed to enter
into an agreement for the sale of the p·roperty and
agreed to the p·rice and terms which shall go into
agreement, then they have reached a complete
understanding for the sale of the prop~erty."
Instead of following this, the trial court submitted
the following prop~osition (76, 83) :
"Proposition No. 1
"'The defendant, as the seller, and J. Holman
Waters, the buyer, reache,d a complete oral or
verbal understanding as to the p-rice and all other
terms and conditions under which the defendant
would sell and Mr. Waters would buy the listed
pToperty.''
The jury was told to either answer this false or
true. Of course, this language needed further clarification for the reason that under the p~lain wording of this
proposition if there were, any terms left to future determination then all of the terms upon which the defendant and Waters would sell had not been agreed to. The
court then attempted to shore up this inaccurate language
by giving Instruction No. 9-G (79) wherein the jury were
instructed concerning- the meaning of this language.
There are three obvious objections to this method of pre-
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senting a case. In the first place, Instruction 9-G limits
those things which could be left to the future when the
evidence indicates there were a number of other items
which the .P·arties d~d not intend to place in the contract
of sale, or at least the jury could have so found. In the
second place, this instruction giving supposed meaning
to the sp~ecial verdict is inaccurate and misleading. In
the third place the jury was going to answer a clearly
worded proposition and you cannot change the true
meaning of those words.
From the testimony introduced in this case a conclusion might be reached that defendant and Waters came
to a complete agreement as to all things which were to
be placed in the contract of sale. After the meeting ''ith
Attorney Hogan, defendant and Waters, !Ir. Waters
came away with the definite understanding that all terms
had been agreed to which were to be included in the
corntract and the only formality left 'vas to put the same
in written form. He testified as follows (17±):

"Q. As you left for Mr. Hogan's office was there
any areas in which there 'vas any disagreement between you on this sale?
A.

Not to be included in the sales contract.

Q.

What was

A.

No, not that were to be included in the sales
contract."

that~

Defendant indicated in his testimony that tl1ere were
some areas where complete agreen1ent had not been
reached. The jury could have found this to be true, but
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also could have found that these areas of disagree1nent
"rere not to be included in the contract of sale. Obviously,
there was to be nothing put into the contract concerning
the date defendant 'vas to give up the occup·ation of the
home (173). He was under the necessity of building a
new home on the acre retained .and was not exactly sure
as to when this home would be ready for occup·ancy. Mr.
Waters te·stified (172, 173) there was a discussion concerning the occupancy of the house. This seemed to be
the 1nain problem .and Mr. Waters was only interested in
having the house available so that his manager would be
able to move in and permit his children to go to the Park
City schools. · They talked of occupancy by September
1st. Mr. W ate~rs also testified that defendant said that
he probably could assist in the op·eration of the ranch
to pay for the occupancy of the· home. Concerning the
relationship of these matters to the contract of sale, Mr.
Waters testified (173) :

"A. The

~fay

first date was for p·ossession, although .allowing him to stay in the home,
which was something which we talked between
ourselves, having nothing to do with the sale,
or selling agreement."

Defendant, concerning his assistance to Mr. Waters
in the op,eration of the r.anch, testified there was some
discussion as to whether he would be available to give
Mr. Waters some advice and indicating that there had
not been comple·te meeting of the minds on this subject,
that as Mr. Waters was leaving Mr. Hogan's office he
made the statement that defendant was to operate this
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ranch for the use of living in the home. Defendant stated
thrut he was upset by this because he was not in a position to operate his farm, build a home and carry on the
other obligations that he had ( 217, 218).
Another area in which the jury could find there had
not been complete agreement, but which was not to be
included within the sales contract, was the discussion concerning rights of wa.y for, and installation of, pipe lines
from the well to the acre reserved by defendant. In regard to this p~ip·e line situation defendant testified (203,
205):

"Q. What did you resolve in regard to the pipeline from the spring to this building lot~
A.

We discussed various ways of which we might
construct this new pipeline, and we never did
come to an agreement."

''A.

We have a joint ownership of the present
sp·ring, with other people, and although we
are not on the same pip·eline, and taking another pipeline from this spring probably
would enter into some problem with the other
co-owners of the spring, which we had not
discussed at this time, and so Mr. Waters
and I talked this over.

"I wanted him to fully understand the conditions of the spring, and we discussed various
ways we might get this share of the water that
would go to me.
"And we had also the problem of the time of
year which we would construct the new pipeline
inasmuch as we would have to go through growing
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crops, and these all were problems that 've discussed.
"Now we didn't come to any specific understanding on what kind of an arrangement we
would make. These were thillgs that we tentatively set aside to talk about before 've made our
final agreement."
Also, under the evidence the jury could find that no
specific reference in the contract vv-as to be made relative
to the defendant being permitted to use the 1nilking facilities if he needed them (173) or whether there was to
be a specific reference in the contract to the fact that the
heater was to be left in the milkhouse (185). With these
subjects which the jury could have found were not to be
in the sales contract but v.rere to be left for future determination, the court unduly and incorrectly limite·d this
field to the two specific p·roposi tions relating to possession date of the property as a 'vhole and to the date of occupation of the home located on the ranch. Because of
these other areas which could be left for future determination, the trial court's method of submitting this proposition to the jury 'vas inaccurate, incorreet and misleading.
Also, there was e·vidence that there was some question about the descriptions of the property which the jury
under the instructions could have believed prevented an
agreement on "all terms" (212, 228).
Analysis of Instruction 9-G (74) given by the trial
court shows it to be confusing and misleading. The~re
are only two distinct propositions considered in this instruction, one is the matter of the possession of the ranch
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and the second is the occupancy of the home. The court
stated to the jury in this instruction that if the housing
problem was left to future determina:tion but all other
terms had been agreed to, then they should answer that
the p~roposition submitted was true. Then comes the next
paragr.ap~h in which the trial court states that if the defendant and Mr. Waters did not agree on when, under
the proposed written contract of sale, either the possession of the ranch was to be taken or the house was to he
taken by ~fr. Waters, then they should answer the proposition No. 1 as false.
This is an incorreet statement of the law for the
reason that if the parties wanted to agree that there
would be a sale and they would enter into a contract for
the sale and leave for future dete~rmination both the
matter of possession and house occupancy, nevertheless
the proposition should be answered true. The trial
court should not he p~ermitted to dictate to which terms
of sale the parties we~re required to agree. The only
issue was whether plaintiff h.ad procured a person who
was ready, able and willing to buy the property upon
such p~rice and terms as defendant and Mr. \\Taters might
agree upon during the life of the listing contract.
We respectfully submit that the trial court committe~d e~rror in not submitting the case to the jury in
accordanc:e with the requests above indicated made by
plaintiff. We further submit that the trial court committed error in submitting the case to the jury under its
Proposition 1 and Instruction 9-G for the re-ason that
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these instructions constituted an inaccurate and incorrect
statement of the law and in view of the evidence introduced the matter of what could be left to future determination was p~rejudicially limited by these instructions.
POIN'T II.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INSTRUCTING THE
JURY THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN DEFENDANT
AND WATERS WAS NOT ENFORCEABLE.

The trial court instructed the jury in its Instruction
No. 9-F (78) as follows:
"You are instructed that under the Utah
statutes, an agreement to buy real estate is not
enforceable unless such .agreement is in writing
and is signed by the party to be bound. Therefore,
J. Holman Waters could not have been legally held
by the defendant Loertscher and could not have
been required in law to have complied with or
performed .any oral agreement, if any, which the
buyer and seller may have made or reached.
"You are further instructed that in order for
the parties to the sale to have reached a complete
understanding it was unnecessary for the agreement to be binding on the seller and the buyer.
There could be an agreeme~nt within the terms of
the listing contract without said agreement being
a binding agreement between the buyer and the
seller."
There 'vas absolutely no issue joined on this subject. Of course, the contract bHtween defendant and
Mr. Waters was oral and therefore unenforceable agamst
Mr. Waters or against defendant, but that was not the
issue involved here. The issue was whether or not plain-
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tiff had produced a person who was ready, able and
willing to purchase the property.
This instruction of necessity was p·rejudicial to
plaintiff because it informed the jury that defendant was
not in a position to enforce the contract against \Vaters.
The prejudicial nature of this becomes apparent when
we· turn to the testimony of defendant wherein he stated
(236):

''Q. You had talked during this period of timefrom January or February, up until this
period of time-Let's say February on-you
talked to p·eople about buying your property.
I thought you ~testified to that~
A.

I did attempt to try to make a deal. I couldn ~t
close the deal because I had no signed contract with Mr. Waters."

The second paragraph does not eliminate the prejudicial nature of the first paragraph in the instruction.
We are unable to make any determination of 'vhat
possible eonnection this instruction had with the case
other than to give the jury the understanding that plaintiff's effort had resulted in no legally enfoceable rights
bestowed upon defendant.
How could it possibly be proper for the trial court
to say that the agreement is void but that makes no
difference~ If it makes no difference then nothing should
be said about it. This red herring never should have
been dragged across the path of this jury as the·y sought
to decide this case·.
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In Gray v. Blake, 128 Colo. 381, 262 P.2d 741 (1953),
an action was brought to recover a co1nmission. Plaintiff
claimed to have produced a purchaser for certain real
estate-. A jury returned a verdict for defendant. On
appeal this was reversed. The court there instructed
the jury as follows:
"The agreement attached to the complaint and
marked Exhibit 'A' is not a contract of sale· such
as creates an obligation on the part of the defendant to sell or the plaimtiff to buy, but is merely an
option giving the right to p~urchase within a limited time without imposing any obligation to purchase."
The word "plaintiff" obviously is in error and referred to the alleged purchaser. In holding this instruction reversible error the court stated:
"By Instruction No.7, above quoted, the trial
court in effect told the jury that Gray had not performed his part of the agreement with Blake and
that the offer and tender of Kincheloe ·was without force or effect as regards the service p~laintiff
claimed he had performed. By telling the jury in
Instruction No. 7 that Exhibit 'A' was not a contract of sale, in view of all the attendant facts
shown by the rooords, the trial court erred. As an
abstract proposition of law Instruction No. 7
doubless is correct, yet it had no applicability to
the facts in the instant case and could only serve
to confuse the jury."
The Utah Supreme Court has reversed cases because
the trial court instructed the jury on matters having no
relation to the genuine isuses of the case. See, for ex-
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ample: Moore v. D&RGW RR Co., 4 Utah 2d 255, 292
P.2d 849 (1956).
We submit that prejudicial error was p·erpetrated
when the trial court gave this wholly irrelevant instruction pointed toward giving the defendant an advantage
to which he was not entitled.
POIN·T III.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY INS'TRUCTING THE
JURY THAT THE WRIT'TEN OFFER DID NOT COMPLY
WITH THE LIS'TING AGREEMENT.

The trial court instructed the jury as follows (75):

"No. 9-C
"You are instructed that, as a matter of law,
the evidenc-e shows that the only written offer secured by the plaintiff from anyone to purchase
the prop!erty listed by the defendant was the written offer, dated February 20, 1959, and signed by
J. Holman Waters of Salt Lake City, Utah.
''You are further instructed that, as a matter
of law, said written offer was not at the price nor
in accordance with the terms of the listing agreement, and the Court, therefore, instructs 3..-ou that,
as a matter of law, the securing of this written
offer would not comply with the listing agreement. The defendant was not required to accept it,
and the defendant is not liable to the plaintiff for
the plaintiff's having secured said written offer."
Here, .again, a red herring was inserted into the case.
There was no contention at any time that the written
offer of F:ebruary 20, 1959, was in compliance with the
te·rms of the listing agreement (117). This was not an
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issue in this case and had nothing at all to do with the
final result. Here, again, the instruction is pointed toward showing the plaintiff had not given the defendant
an enforceable right and advised the jury concerning an
issue which they could not even consider in connection
with answering either of the prop·ositions suhmi:tted to
them. We rely on the cases cited in Point II to indicate
that this constituted prejudicial error.
POINT IV.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO INSTRUCT THE JURY THA:T IF THE PARTIES AGREED
TO THE PRICE AND 'TERMS FOR 'THE SALE AND DEFENDANT LATER :CALLED THE TRANSACTION OFF,
PLAINTIFF· WAS EN'TITLED TO A VERDICT.

The plaintiff reques:ted the trial court to instruct
the jury as follows (48):
"Defendant, in the listing agreement of February 14, 1959, agreed to pay to plaintiff a $5,000
commission if plaintiff found a buyer who was
ready, able and willing to buy the real e~state here
involved at the price and terms set forth in the
listing agreement or at any other price or terms
which defendant might agree to.
"Therefore, if you find by a p·erp·onderance
of the evidence, that defendant produced J. Holman Waters as a buyer, that the defendant and J.
Holman Waters agreed to the p~rice and terms
for the sale of the real estate involved, and that
defendant later called the transaction off, then
you should return a verdict in favor of plaintiff
and against defendant for the sum of $5,000.00. ''
That this is a correct statement of the law clearly
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appears from Curtis v. Mortensen, 1 Utah 2d 354, 267
P. 2d 237; see annotation 169 A.L.R. 605.
Plaintiff requested this instruction because it followed the testimony of Mr. \Vaters and if the jury believed as Mr. Waters had testified then a verdict should
l1ave been returned in favor of plaintiff and against
defendant. This instruction was given to emphasize the
proposition that if the agreen1ent had been reached and
defendant called the transaction off, then and in that
event, plaintiff \vas still entitled to recover. ·Certainly, in
view of the fact that the court gave Instructions 9-C, 9-D,
and 9-F expressing evidence favorable to defendant this
instruction should have been given in all fairness to
plaintiff.
We submit prejudicial error was committed in the
refusal of the coulit to submit this instruction to the jury.
POINT V.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN SUBMITTING TO THE
JURY PROPOSITION NO. 2 AS TO WHETHER AT THE
TIME THE LISTING AGREEMENT WAS SIGNED BY DEFENDAN'T PLAINTIFF KNEW THAT DEFENDANT'S WIFE
WAS A CO-OWNER OF THE PROPERTY.

By Instruction 9-E the court instructed the jury as
follows (77) :
''You are instructed that the defendant,
Loertscher, contends that at the time the listillg
was given to the plaintiff Smith, Mr. Smith lmew
that the wife of Mr. Loertscher was a joint o\\rner
of the property. Mr. S1nith denies that he had
such lmowledge. It is not necessary to Your decision for the Court to instruct yo~ on the legal
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consequences of the existence or la.ck of such
knowledg·e, but you are instructed to resolve this
conflict by ans,vering the following question
"At the time the listing agreement was signed
by the defendant, did the plaintiff know that Mrs.
Loertscher, the wife of the defendant, was a coowner of the property~"
Also, the court submitted to the jury Proposition
No.2 as follows (84) :
"P ropOSl·t··lOll N 0. 2•

"At the time the listing agreement was signed
by the defendant, the plaintiff lrnew that Mrs.
Loertscher, the wife of the defendant, was a coowner of the p~roperty.
There was no evidence which would justify a finding
,that at the time the listing agreement was signed plaintiff had any knowledge that defendant's wife was a coowner of the p·roperty. Mr. Smith did not call for a legal
description of the property and did not make any examination of the records until February 19th, five days after
the listing contract was signed (162). Plaintiff also testified that he had no knowledge until the new plats had
com~ out some time later that defendant's wife had any
interest in this prop~erty (238).
Defendant testified he gave the valuation notice to
plaintiff after the listing agreement had been signed
(219). This is the only way that plaintiff could have
received any notice of who owned the property and this
shows it was after the agreement had been signed. Defendant testified as follows (218, 219):
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"Q. Mr. Loertscher, as I understand your testimony in connection with this valuation notice,
you say you gave that to ~fr. Smith, after
the listing agreement had been signed~
A. That's right.. He asked me as he was leaving
if I had ~orne identification. I said 'I have got
a rTax evaluation notice' so I just went back
in and gave it to him.
Q.

Did you eve-r give him any other tax valuation
notices~

A. No."
Also, defendant conceded that on his deposition he
testified that he did not turn OiVer the valuation notice
to plaintiff until .after Mr. Waters had been up to the
ranch. This was two or three days after the listing agreement had been signed and executed (219, 220). Also,
this proposition was absolutely immaterial because there
never was any contention at any time that defendant's
wife objected to the, sale or would not sign the contract.
As a matter of fact she was eognizant of the fact that
the prop·erty was being listed for sale. She was present
when conversations were had at the attorney's office
(174, 214) She was consulted by her husband as to the
time when possession should be given to nir. waters
(168, 222). Never at any tune did she object to the sale
or indicate that she was displeased with it.
There are three versions as to the reason defendant
gave in explaining why the transaction was not closed
by written agreement. Plaintiff testified that on March
31 defendant stated to plaintiff that he had come down
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to tell him that he was calling off the deal. He stated that
he was not going to move down to the Peterson ranch
and that he was going to sell all of it (140). Mr. Waters
testified when defendant ca.me to his plac1e in the latter
part of 1iarch, or ,the forepart of April, he stated: ''Holman, I can't sell you the ranch.'' He gave as a reason that
he couldn't get out of his cows and milk base what he had
to get and he did not know wha,t to do. Mr. W ate~rs
pointed out that he had been counting on moving his
cattle on to this ranch and defendant replied that he did
not want to put him on the spot and that if Mr. Waters
had no plaee to send his cattle he might rent him some
pasturage (178). Defendant testified he had come out
to 1\fr. W ate~rs to see if he could "get more time beyond
the possession date'' or else he could not go through with
the deal and Mr. Waters refused to make any e~tension
of time (216).
Thus it can be clearly seen that the defendant's wife's
participation or refusal to p~articipate in this sale has
nothing at all to do with the issues. Again, we have an
immaterial issue placed in the path of the jury and it
could have no possible implication other than unfavorable
to plaintiff in that it indicated he was attempting to sell
somebody's land from whom he had no listing agreement.
In any event the weight of authority is to the effeet
that the fact that a wife is a co-owne~r of the property
does not afford to the husband who has listed his prop~
erty a defense against paying a commission. See Mc'Alinden v. Nelson, 121 c·ai. App. 2d 136, 2'62 P.2d 6~27,
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Schurz v. Gelber, 117 A.C.A. 857, 256 P. 2d 634, Traxler
v. McLeran, 116 ·Cal. App. 226, 2 P. 2d 553, Russell v.
Ramm, 200 Cal. 348, 254 Pac. 532, Johnson v. K rver, 59
Cal. App. 330, 210 Pac. 966, Pliler v. ThompsO'n, 84 Okla.
200, 202 Pae. 1016, Kaufman v. Haney, 80 Cal. App·. 2d
249, 182 P. 2d 250. Also the listing agreement (Exhibit
1) showed only defendant as owner and to show ownership of another would violate the parole evidence rnl'e.
Diamond v. Chiate, 81 Ariz. 86, 300 P. 2d 583.
CONCLUSION
In tllis case there was a decided conflict in the testimony of the witnesses. This being so, it became very important that careful and partial instructions should be
given to the jury so that the case could be considered
by the jury free of any influence from prejudicial ills tructions.
·The case was not presented to the jury on a proposition which aecurately set forth the issue to be determined.
1

On the other hand, the instructions given 'Yere not
only confusing, but also misleading, as indicated by the
foregoing arguments. Also, a number of instructions
were given which slanted the jury's vie·w. s toward the
defendant arid we submit did have a great influence upon
the verdict returne·d. There was no reason for telling
the jury that the oral agreement was unenforceable,
that the written offer did not comply with the lis·ting
agreement and that the plaintiff was attempting to sell
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property which did not belong to the p,erson with whom
he contracted. We submit that each of these errors were
prejudicial to plaintiff and certainly the accumulation of
errors in these instructions constituted p~rejudice to
plaintiff.
We respectfully submit that this ·Court should reverse the judgment and remand the case for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted,

RAWLINGS, WALLACE,
ROBERTS & BLACK
BRIGHAM E. ROBERTS

Counsel for PlaintiJff
530 Judge Building
Salt Lake City, Utah
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